ceipt. 12 After Place refused to consent to a search of his suitcases, one of the DEA agents responded that they were going to take the luggage to try to obtain a search warrant from a federal judge. Place declined the agents' invitation to accompany them.
The agents then transported both suitcases to Kennedy Airport where a trained narcotics detection dog performed a "sniff test." Approximately ninety minutes after the luggage had been seized, the dog reacted positively to the smaller suitcase. After obtaining a search warrant, DEA agents opened the suitcase, discovering 1,125 grams of cocaine. 13
Indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver,' 4 Place moved in the district court to suppress the cocaine discovered during the search because he claimed his fourth amendment rights were violated by the warrantless seizure of his luggage. 15 The district court denied his motion, relying on United States v. Van Leeuwen to justify applying TerrY standards to the detention of physical items.' 6 broke into a sweat when questioned in Miami, and he remarked that he had recognized the officers as police; Place's baggage tags listed different addresses, neither of which were believed to exist; Place scanned the area at LaGuardia Airport and appeared nervous; and, he told the agents that he knew that they were "cops." United States v. Place, 498 F. Supp. at 1225-26. Place displayed many of the traits listed in the "drug courier profile," a compilation of characteristics common to those engaged in narcotics trafficking. The DEA developed the profile in 1974 to provide its agents with guidelines for spotting couriers. Frequently found characteristics include: travel between major "source" and "use" cities; rapid turnaround times; travel with little or no luggage; departure from the plane either first or last; nervousness; use of an alias; and payment in cash. "Secondary" characteristics include: an almost exclusive use of public transportation to leave the airport; a telephone call immediately upon arrival; use of a fictitious callback number; and excessively frequent travel to "source" and "use" cities. Greene & Wice, The D.E.A. Drug Courier Prqfle: Histoy and Analysi, 22 S. TEX. LJ. 261, 269-73 (1982) . 12 103 S. Ct. at 2640. A later DEA computer check on Place's driver's license revealed no prior offenses. Id.
Id.
14 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) (1981) , prohibits any person from knowingly or intentionally manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.
15 498 F. Supp. 1217 Supp. (E.D.N.Y. 1980 . Place also argued that his detentions at the airports in Miami and New York were not grounded on reasonable suspicion and that the "sniff test" was administered in a manner calculated to achieve a tainted reaction from the dog. Id. at 1221, 1228. The district court rejected both arguments. Id. at 1225, 1228. Reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, Place then pleaded guilty and was convicted. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d at 45.
16 United States v. Place, 498 F.Supp. at 1226-27. The district court asserted that United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) , "extended the Terry logic to the detention of parcels of mail believed to contain contraband." 498 F. Supp. at 1226. In Van Leguwen, the defendant mailed two packages under circumstances that aroused the suspicion of postal employees. Postal agents detained the packages for approximately 29 hours while customs officials obtained information about the addresses listed on the packages. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the removal and ninety-minute detention of Place's luggage before the dog sniff established probable cause violated his fourth amendment rights because the seizure of the suitcases could not reasonably be characterized as a permissible Teny-type investigative stop. 17 Although deciding the case under Terry standards, the court criticized the lower court's reading of Van Leeuwen to expand the scope of the Terry doctrine to include seizures of property.
1 8 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the fourth amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from briefly seizing luggage, reasonably suspected of containing narcotics, for the purpose of subjecting it to a "sniff test" by a trained narcotics detection dog.
19
III. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
Because the prolonged seizure of Place's suitcases violated his fourth amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court, per Justice O'Connor, unanimously affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of Place's conviction. 20 The Court also held that the principles of Terry v.
at 249. Because this information established probable cause, a United States commissioner issued a search warrant. Finding counterfeit coins when they opened the packages, the authorities resealed the packages and sent them to their destinations. Id. at 250. The Supreme Court held that because of the nature, suspicious character, and different destinations of the packages, the unavoidable delay in contacting the farthest destination, and the distance between the commissioner's office and the post office, "a 29-hour delay between the mailings and the service of the warrant cannot be said to be 'unreasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 253. 17 660 F.2d at 52. Unless the DEA agents' actions fell within an exception to the requirements of the Warrant Clause, "the warrantless seizure of Place's baggage without probable cause would clearly violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 50.
18 After noting the argument that Terry standards should not apply to the detention of personal property because property cannot resume its course independently after being detained as a person can, the court remarked that "for present purposes, in addition to assuming without deciding that an investigative stop was justified, we are willing also to apply the principles of Terry to seizures of property." Id. at 50. Contra Comment, Seizing Luggage on Less than Probable Cause, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 637 (1981) .
The appellate court claimed, however, that the district court's reliance on Van Leeuwen was "misplaced." 660 F.2d at 52. The court distinguished Van Leeuwen in four major respects: (1) the owner of the packages voluntarily gave up their custody and control during the time required for mail delivery; (2) the postal agents already had lawful custody of the parcels when they decided to detain them; (3) mere detention of mail not in the owner's control is no personal deprivation and produces, at most, a technical interference with one's person or effects; and (4) the Van Leeuwen Court only held that the short detention of mail was reasonable under the facts of the case. Id. at 52-53.
19 457 U.S. 1104 (1982) . The Supreme Court also denied certiorari to Place's cross-petition on the issue of reasonable suspicion. 457 U.S. 1106 (1982) . 20 103 S. Ct. 2637 Ct. (1983 . Adhering to the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine," the Court disallowed the cocaine as evidence even though the DEA agents confiscated it pursuant to a search warrant founded upon probable cause. Because probable cause was established only as a result of the luggage detention and subsequent "canine sniff," the cocaine bore the Ohio21 and its progeny 22 permit law enforcement authorities to detain personal luggage briefly for the purpose of pursuing a properly limited investigation based on reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics. 23 In addition, the Court held that the exposure of Place's luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
24
The Court began its discussion by acknowledging that the seizure of personal property is generally considered per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment unless authorized by a judicial warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause. 25 Turning its attention to the facts of Place, the Court premised its discussion on the theory that investigatory detentions of luggage seized from a suspect's custody should be subject to the same constitutional limitations as investigatory detentions of the person. 38 Justice O'Connor stressed that seizure of luggage from a suspect's immediate possession can invade personal liberty interests as well as possessory interests. Although technically remaining free, suspects realistically may have their plans disrupted by having to arrange for the return of the luggage or electing to remain with it until the investigation is completed. 3 9 Apply-34 Id. at 2643-44. The Tery exception is premised on the notion that there exist varying degrees of intrusion on personal liberty interests. Because the brief "stop and frisk" is less intrusive than a formal arrest, the Tery Court reasoned that the general rule requiring probable cause (to render fourth amendment searches and seizures reasonable) could be replaced by the reasonable suspicion requirement when the balancing test shows a strong governmental interest and a limited intrusion on the individual. To justify applying the Terry doctrine to seizures of property, the Court in P/ace first had to find that different degrees of intrusion also exist in the property context. Id. at 2642-44.
35 Id. at 2643. Justice O'Connor emphasized that "[t]he seizure may be made after the owner has relinquished control of the property to a third party or, as here, from the immediate custody and control of the owner." Id.
To illustrate the point, the Court contrasted the factual situation in Place (seizure from the owner's custody) with the situation in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention of packages after the owner had relinquished control to the postal authorities). "'Van Leeuwen was an easy case for the Court because the defendant was unable to show that the invasion intruded upon either a privacy interest in the contents of the packages or a possessog interest in the packages themselves.' 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6, p. 60 (1982 Supp.) " Id. at 2643-44 n.6 (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 2643. The Court noted that "the police may confine their investigation to an onthe-spot inquiry-for example, immediate exposure of the luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog-or transport the property to another location." Id. at 2643-44.
37 Id. at 2644. 38 Id. at 2645. The Court rejected the government's argument that "the point at which probable cause for seizure of luggage from the person's presence becomes necessary is more distant than in the case of a Terry stop of the person himself." Id. 39 Id. Justice O'Connor quoted Professor LaFave, who has suggested that, at least when the authorities do not inform the suspect of how and when his luggage will be returned, "seizure of the object is tantamount to seizure of the person .... [The] person must either remain on the scene or. . .seemingly surrender his effects permanently to the police. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6 at 61 (1982 Supp.)" The Court did note that "in some cir-ing the Terry standards for seizures of persons to the seizure of Place's luggage, the Court found that the ninety-minute detention alone rendered the investigation unreasonable. 4°T he Court emphasized that the brevity of the invasion is important in determining whether the intrusion can be justified merely on reasonable suspicion.
4 1 The Court also indicated that the diligence of the officers in pursuing the investigation is relevant in ascertaining whether the length of the detention is reasonable. 42 In Place, the agents could have minimized the intrusion on Place's fourth amendment rights by arranging to have the narcotics detection dog waiting at LaGuardia Airport when Place's flight arrived, but they failed to do so. 43 The agents exacerbated the violation by failing to tell Place where they were taking his luggage, how long it might be detained, and how it would be returned to him if their investigation proved futile.
44
Justice O'Connor also considered whether the "canine sniff' of Place's luggage constituted a search requiring probable cause.
45 She emphasized that a "canine sniff" does not require the opening of a suitcase and reveals only the presence or absence of narcotics. Therefore, unlike a traditional police search, a "canine search" avoids any of the inconvenience or embarassment to the owner that may result from the wholesale disclosure of the luggage's contents to public scrutiny. 4 6 Noting that no other investigative procedure is so limited in the manner of conducting the inquiry and in the content of the information revealed, cumstances," seizures of property are less intrusive than seizures of the person; id. at 2645; however, it failed to discuss what might constitute such a "circumstance." See inra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
4 Id. 41 Id. The Court was not willing to approve the ninety-minute seizure of Place's luggage on less than probable cause primarily because it had never approved a Teny-type stop of a person for such a prolonged time period; however, the Court also refused to establish an outside time limitation for a valid investigative stop. d. at 2646. Justice O'Connor believed that such a limit would undermine the ability of police to gauge their actions to the demands of each individual situation without concern about compliance with a rigid time frame. Id. at 2646 n.10.
42 Id at 2645. 43 Id. at 2645-46. If the police had had a dog waiting, they could have saved time and avoided the intrusion on Place's possessory interests caused by the removal of his luggage to Kennedy Airport. Id. at 2646 n.9.
44 Id. at 2646. 45 Justice O'Connor considered the "canine sniff" issue because if the "canine sniff" "is itself a search requiring probable cause, the initial seizure of respondent's luggage for the purpose of subjecting it to the sniff test-no matter how brief-could not be justified on less than probable cause." Id. at 2644. Place, however, did not contest the validity of "canine sniffs" in general in the district court, and the court of appeals did not address or decide the issue. Moreover, neither party briefed nor argued the issue before the Supreme Court. Id. at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring) .
46 Id. at 2644.
the Court concluded that the "canine sniff" of Place's luggage did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
47
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who concurred only in the result, criticized the Court's reliance on Terry to uphold the constitutionality of luggage seizures based upon reasonable suspicion.
4 Justice Brennan argued that, in addition to being unnecessary to the judgment, the luggage seizure decision finds no support in Terry principles; the Court departed from settled fourth amendment doctrines and significantly diluted the constitutional protections against government interference with personal property. 49 The most remarkable aspect of the Supreme Court's decision validating seizures of luggage upon less than probable cause is that the Court did not need to consider the issue at all. The ninety-minute detention of Place's suitcases violated his fourth amendment rights and thereby tainted the confiscated cocaine, regardless of whether the Court found the initial luggage seizure justified. Therefore, Justices Brennan and Blackmun validly criticized the Court for ignoring a judicial convention by unnecessarily deciding a constitutional question.
58
Although it was not compelled to address the issue, the Court cor-55 Id. at 2652-53 (emphasis added). Because Justice Marshall joined in both of the concurring opinions, some confusion exists in ascertaining his position. Whereas Justice Brennan would always invalidate a temporary independent seizure of luggage based upon less than probable cause, Justice Blackmun indicated that such a practice conceivably could fall within the T7rr A exception.
56 Id. at 2653. Justice Blackmun disagreed with the Court's view that the diligence of the police is a relevant factor in ascertaining the extent of the intrusion. In his view, whether the police conscientiously pursue the investigation does not affect the duration and intrusiveness of the seizure. Id. at 2653 n.2.
57 Id. at 2653. Justice Blackmun also suggested that a "canine sniff" might fall within the Terry exception for minimally intrusive searches that can be justified on reasonable suspicion. See infia notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
58 Id. at 2646 (Brennan, J., concurring) ; id. at 2651-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Brennan suggested that the Court was "unable to 'resist the pull to decide the constitutional issues involved in this case on a broader basis than the record before [it] imperatively requires.' "Id. at 2646 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 581 (1969) ).
The Supreme Court has developed a set of rules under which it has avoided deciding a significant number of the constitutional questions presented to it. Justice Rutledge once emphasized that " '[i]f there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.'" Rescue Army v. Second, police may conduct certain limited invasions supported by less than probable cause. 62 In Teny, the Court first recognized a special category of police behavior so substantially less intrusive than a fullscale search or seizure that a balancing test could replace the strict probable cause requirement in determining whether an invasion is reasonable. 6 3 The Court balances the nature and scope of the intrusion against the substantial government interest served by the invasion. While a substantial law enforcement interest may justify a limited intrusion, "the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts" warranting a reasonable belief that a suspect presents a threat to the asserted interest.
64
Before applying the Teny balancing test, the Place Court had to reach two conclusions: (1) seizures of property can vary in nature and extent, and (2) 692, 700 (1981) . In such cases, the standard of probable cause. . . represented the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. The standard applied to all arrests, without the need to "balance" the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208. Probable cause exists when there is sufficient evidence to lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe that a crime has been or is being committed; it does not require evidence sufficient to convict. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949 73 One commentator has noted that
[s]eizure of an item not contemporaneous with a search is the exception rather than the rule. In fact, with the exception of a "plain view" seizure, a noncontemporaneous seizure happens only when the item seized is really the place that subsequently will be searched and from which other items will, in turn, be seized. Comment, supra note 18, at 645. When a seizure involves the collection of evidence to be used at trial, controversies that arise usually concern the validity of the search rather than the seizure. Id.
74 Prosecutors use property seized for evidentiary purposes at trial. Dispossession lasts as long as the police can utilize the property to incriminate the suspect. 511-12 (1980) (Stops aimed at investigating a particular person are more intrusive than those designed to acquire information because a person stopped might incriminate himself; however, it is difficult to distinguish between purely informational and investigatory stops).
persons, can be plotted on a sliding scale. 76 Some seizures of luggage entail less than full-scale seizures. For example, without moving the suitcases at all, DEA agents could seize luggage for a few minutes while a trained narcotics detection dog sniffs it for drugs. Terry and its progeny placed great importance on time and distance factors in determining whether a particular police action resembled a full-scale search or seizure. In United States v. 77 the Court justified seizures of travelers based on reasonable suspicion because the stops usually lasted no more than a minute. In Dunaway v.
New York ,78 the Court held that a custodial interrogation approximated a traditional arrest and required probable cause where the police transported the suspect to the police station for questioning. The longer police detain suspects or the farther they transport them, the more closely a particular category of police behavior resembles a full-scale search or seizure. Similarly, the longer police hold suitcases or the farther they move them, the more closely luggage detentions resemble full-scale seizures.
Moreover, police detain suitcases primarily for investigatory purposes. DEA agents and other law enforcement officers seize luggage at airports to obtain additional information about possible narcotics trafficking. Because police utilize luggage seizures as investigative tools, and because they have the ability to limit the time and area involved, the Court correctly concluded that some luggage seizures constitute less than full-scale seizures and justify application of the Terry balancing test.
Applying such a balancing test when police seize luggage directly from a suspect's custody, the seizure intrudes minimally on fourth amendment interests. In the past, the Court has analyzed various factors in assessing the degree of intrusion on a suspect's protected rights. [Vol. 74
These include the actual physical intrusiveness, the subjective effect of the intrusion, and the police officer's discretion in selecting suspects. Commentators have suggested that property seizures intrude on a suspect's liberty interests because property cannot move independently of its owner. Comment, supra note 18, at 645. Property seizures, however, need not inevitably intrude on a suspect's liberty interests because the luggage can be moved through other means. For example, the police could arrange for its delivery to the suspect or for its loading into the baggage compartment of a plane. 85 103 S. Ct. at 2649 (Brennan, J., concurring) . The Court has never directly addressed the propriety of concomitant property seizures. In Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 Ct. , 1326 Ct. (1983 , however, the Court indicated that the police officers justifiably detained the suspect and his luggage on reasonable suspicion. One commentator has suggested that the permissible scope of a Terry-type investigative detention may include "locating and examining objects abandoned by the suspect." 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2, at 37 (1978) . the same limitations on the permissible scope of an investigative detention of property as those applicable to seizures of suspects. 8 6 Therefore, police must restrict the time and area involved in luggage seizures to the same extent that they would for seizures of suspects.
In applying the second part of the balancing test, the Court correctly assessed the substantiality of the government interests asserted to justify the intrusion. 8 7 The narcotics problem has generated much social unrest in the United States. It penetrates all social strata and takes its toll in increased crime rates, lost wages, and extra demand for social services. 88 Police arrested an estimated 676,000 persons for narcotics laws violations in 1982 in .89 In 1980 
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narcotics traffickers' behavior often approximates that of innocent travelers.
In previous decisions, the Court has allowed limited intrusions based on similar government interests. Officer safety, combined with the law enforcement interest in deterring crime, justified allowing stop and frisks on less than probable cause in Terry:
We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.
94
Although officer safety provided the primary justification for frisks, Justice Harlan indicated in his concurring opinion in Terry that Terry implicitly held that, apart from any concern for officer safety, the interest in crime prevention and detection justifies seizures in the form of forcible stops.
9 5
Other members of the Court have adopted Harlan's view. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Michigan v. Summers,96 emphasized that the need to investigate criminal activity underlies Terry-type seizures. In Michigan v. Summers, the Court further delineated the scope of what constitutes a substantial government interest. The Court noted three reasons that justify the detention of an occupant while police search premises pursuant to a valid search warrant: preventing flight should incriminating evidence be found; minimizing the risk of harm to the officers and occupants; and completing the authorized search in an orderly manner. 97 Id. at 700 n.12. Professor LaFave has compiled a list of general "investigative techniques which may be utilized effectively in the course of a T7ry-type stop." 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 85, at 36. These include interrogation, communication with others, and examination of premises or objects. Id. at 36-37. 98 452 U.S. at 702-03. In Summers, however, the Court emphasized: Of prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent's house for contraband. A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated .... The detention of one of the residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself. Id. at 701. Because the intrusion was so slight compared to that caused by the search, the Court readily accepted more generalized law enforcement interests as justification for the detention. In Place, however, the government made no showing of probable cause. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d at 49. narcotics trafficking justified a Terry-type seizure. The Government makes a convincing demonstration that the public interest demands effective measures to prevent the illegal entry of aliens ... . [T] hese aliens create significant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resident aliens for jobs, and generating extra demand for social services.10 3
The Brignoni-Ponce Court indicated that the difficulty in patrolling the long Mexican border also justifed the limited intrusion involved in these investigatory stops. The government interests asserted to justify the investigatory detention in Place mirror the substantial law enforcement concerns recognized by the Court in past cases. Therefore, the Court justifiably allowed these interests to override the minimal intrusion on a suspect's fourth amendment interests resulting from seizure of personal effects.
B. "CANINE SNIFFS" AS SEARCHES
The Supreme Court did not need to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the "canine sniff" of Place's luggage because the Court could have reversed Place's conviction on the grounds that the ninety-minute luggage detention violated his fourth amendment rights and thereby tainted the cocaine confiscated as a result of the seizure. The Court's lack of information greatly hindered its ability to deal 99 446 U.S. 544, 560 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring). 100 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) (plurality opinion). 101 Id. at 1324. The Court later noted that Royer's behavior provided "adequate grounds for suspecting Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage while they attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in a manner that did not exceed the limits of an investigative detention." Id. 
1983]
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adequately with the complexities of the "canine sniff" issue, 0 7 a topic that has divided the lower courts.
1 0 8 Although several arguments support the view that "dog sniffs" of luggage do not constitute searches, an equally strong case exists for the theory that "dog sniffs" are searches within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 0 9
Court ordinarily does not decide matters neither raised before it nor considered by the court of appeals).
Justice O'Connor believed, however, that the Court needed to decide the "canine sniff" issue to resolve fully the luggage seizure issue. She suggested that if "dog sniffs" were searches requiring probable cause, reasonable suspicion could never justify the initial seizure of a suspect's luggage in order to perform a sniff test. 103 S. Ct. at 2644.
Even if police were required to have probable cause to justify a "canine sniff," police could conduct luggage seizures based upon reasonable suspicion. In the past, the Court has established different requirements for various types of police behavior. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (police may seize luggage believed to contain contraband without a warrant, but subsequent search requires warrant); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881-82 (1975) If the police officers here had detected the aroma of the drug through their own olfactory senses, there could be no serious contention that their sniffing in the area of the bags would be tantamount to an unlawful search. ... We fail to understand how the detection of the odoriferous drug by the use of the sensitive and schooled canine senses here employed alters the situation and renders the police procedure constitutionally suspect.
have held that the use of sense-enhancing devices in such "plain view/smell" situations do not constitute searches.' 16 Although "canine sniffs" obtain only limited information, valid arguments exist that refute some of the reasons propounded in support of the Court's holding in Place. "Canine sniffs" do not intrude on innocent travelers' privacy interests in their luggage only to the extent that the dogs are well-trained and accurate, and that any errors tend toward nondetection. In addition, a "plain view/smell" doctrine cannot apply because police officers usually will not be able to detect the presence of narcotics under any conditions without using trained dogs.' 17 Moreover, "canine sniffs" replace rather than enhance an officer's senses. Judge Mansfield, concurring in United States v. Bronstein, argued that a dog's sensitive nose replaces a police officer's senses in the same manner that hidden microphones replace an officer's hearing in areas where the sounds are otherwise inaudible. Comparing "canine sniffs" and magnetometers, Justice Mansfield noted that Neither constitutes a particularly offensive intrusion, such as ransacking the contents of the hidden space, or exposing a person to indignities in the case of a personal search. But the fact remains that each detects hidden objects without actual entry and without the enhancement of human senses. The fact that the canine's search is more particularized and discriminate than that of the magnetometer is not a basis for a legal distinction. 181 Therefore, any attempt to hold that "canine sniffs" do not constitute searches falls short of being completely persuasive.
If the Court wanted to resolve the issue, it could have applied Terry standards and held "dog sniffs" to be searches that are justifiable on the basis of reasonable suspicion 1 9 rather than adopting an inflexible "all or nothing" standard to analyze the constitutionality of "canine sniffs."' 20 Because a "canine sniff' does not approximate a full-scale search in that it does not entail wholesale disclosure of the luggage's contents, courts could validly apply the Terry balancing test. A "dog sniff" involves a relatively limited intrusion on a suspect's fourth amendment interests. The strong government interest in detecting illegal narcotics trafficking could justify conducting "canine sniffs" based upon reasonable suspicion.' 2 1
In holding that "canine sniffs" do not constitute searches, the Court retreated markedly from progressive constitutional interpretation. It returned to the pre-Teny method of validating government intrusions based on less than probable cause by finding that no fourth amendment interests were implicated. The Court has removed "canine sniffs" of luggage in factual situations similar to Place from both the scope of the fourth amendment and the watchful eye of judicial scrutiny. Because it was not adequately informed about "canine sniffs," the Court should have refrained from taking such drastic action.
C.

IMPACT OF PLACE
Although the Court's decision extends the Tery doctrine to seizures of property, it probably will impact very little on current police practices when a suspect has custody of the luggage. Police officers most likely will only detain suitcases incidental to the primary seizure of the suspect for three reasons. First, individuals, rather than their luggage, usually provide the strongest grounds for establishing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 124 Although the Court never directly indicated that the removal of Place's luggage to Kennedy Airport rendered the seizure unreasonable, it did suggest that had the police brought the dog to LaGuardia, such "conduct also would have avoided the further substantial intrusion on respondent's possessory interests caused by the removal of his luggage to another location." 103 S. Ct. at 2646 n.9 (emphasis added). Even if police could move the luggage to another location, the time limitations restrict their ability to transport the suitcases more than a short distance. 126 Also, because suspects will not know that their luggage has been seized, they will not feel compelled to remain with it; thus, seizures do not intrude on suspects' liberty interests. The Court should be extremely careful when it finally addresses this issue. If given too much freedom by the Court, police will have added incentive to seize luggage from the baggage racks. Although not intrinsically detrimental, extended detentions might cause great inconvenience for suspects. For example, should the investigation prove futile, police might not be able to return the luggage by the time suspects arrive to claim it.
The "canine sniff" decision also raises many questions that the Court failed to consider. Since the Court held that "canine sniffs" of luggage in a public place are not searches, sniffs of baggage pickup areas are not subject to constitutional scrutiny because no search or seizure occurs. Isolated or blanket investigations utilizing "dog sniffs" without any objective grounds for suspicion might also be immune from judicial scrutiny.1 2 7 In addition, the Court left unresolved the issue of whether a "4canine sniff" of a person in a public place constitutes a search.128
The use of dogs to sniff luggage for narcotics raises the question of 125 United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention of mail after suspect relinquished control); see supra note 16.
126 One commentator has noted that "Van Leeuwen was an easy case for the Court because the defendant was unable to show that the invasion intruded upon either a privacy interest in the contents of the packages or a possessory interest in the packages themselves." 3 W.
LAFAV E, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.6(e), at 71 (Supp. 1983 (1982) . Second, the Supreme Court limited its holding in Van Leeuwen to the facts of that case, and only cited it twice before Place, neither time for its holding. See Comment, supra note 18, at 640 & n.46.
127 Blanket investigations would run counter to the opinions of many lower courts that have indicated that their decisions would have been different had the "canine sniff" been part of a dragnet-type operation. See, e.g., Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 462. 128 Justice Brennan has expressed his belief that "dog sniffs" of people constitute searches. Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1025-26 (1981) (Brennan, J. , dissenting from denial of certio-what may be admitted into evidence at trial. A dog may "alert" law enforcement officers to a suitcase that contains a gun in addition to (or possibly instead of) drugs. Whether prosecutors will be able to introduce such ancillary evidence will most likely be a topic of intense debate during the next few years.' 2 9 Because luggage will only be subject to full searches if a dog establishes probable cause by "alerting" to the apparent presence of drugs, police will not be able to utilize "canine sniffs" to discover evidence of crime in general. Therefore, the Court should permit the receipt of ancillary evidence since police will rarely discover it independently of discovering narcotics.
The Court should limit the applicability of the Place holding in its future decisions. The severe narcotics problem provides sufficient grounds for a seizure and properly limited investigative detention of luggage based only on reasonable suspicion.°3 0 Although critics have questioned the substantiality of the government interest in curbing narcotics trafficking as justification for such intrusions on a suspect's fourth amendment interests,' 3 ' it makes no sense to prevent luggage seizures when police officers have the right to detain individuals suspected of transporting narcotics on their persons.
The Court must be careful to avoid approving carte blanche luggage seizures for any and all law enforcement interests. Such treatment of the Place extension of the Teny doctrine would further emasculate the probable cause requirement in cases of limited intrusions on a suspect's fourth amendment interests.
3 2 The Te ry doctrine, whether in the context of searches and seizures of persons or property, should remain a stringently applied exception to the probable cause requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holdings in Place that law enforcement authorities may conduct limited seizures of luggage based upon reasonable suspicion and that "canine sniffs" of luggage located in a public place rari). Lower courts have also expressed a desire to place greater restrictions on "canine sniffs" of persons. See, e.g., Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 462; see supra note 108.
129 Several commentators addressed the same concern after the Supreme Court decided Teny. See, e.g., LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Bey'ond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 40,88 (1969) ; The Supreme Court, 1967 Terr, 82 HARV. L. REv. 93, 186 (1968 are not searches touched upon two areas of search and seizure doctrine never before addressed by the Court. Although general constitutional principles and precedent support the luggage seizure decision, the Court should have refrained from considering the "canine sniff" issue. Apart from the merits of these holdings, however, the Court's willingness to address issues unnecessary to the resolution of the case demonstrates its desire to revamp fourth amendment doctrine in the face of law enforcement's inability to curb rising crime rates.
